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THE REGULATION OF MIGRATION IN A TRANSITION ECONOMY:
CHINA’S HUKOU SYSTEM
SHUMING BAO, ÖRN B. BODVARSSON, JACK W. HOU and YAOHUI ZHAO∗
Unlike most countries, China regulates internal migration. Access to public schools,
health services, low-cost housing, and attractive jobs by those who do not have local
registration (Hukou) is often limited. Coincident with the deepening of economic
reforms, Hukou has gradually been relaxed since the 1980s, contributing to a migration
surge. In this study of interprovincial Chinese migration, we address two questions.
First, what is a sensible way of incorporating Hukou into theoretical and empirical
models of migration in China? Second, to what extent has Hukou influenced the scale
and structure of migration? We incorporate two different measures of Hukou into a
modified gravity model nuanced to fit the Chinese case: (1) the migrant’s perceived
probability of securing Hukou and (2) the perceived joint probability of securing Hukou
and a job available only to a registered person. Our tests include a much wider variety
of controls especially important for the Chinese case. Using census data for 1985–90,
1995–2000, and 2000–05, we find that migration is very sensitive to Hukou, with the
greatest sensitivity occurring during the middle period. (JEL J61)
I. INTRODUCTION
In most countries, internal migration is unreg-
ulated. That is not the case in China, where
migration is restricted through a “Household
Registration System,” also called “Hukou.”
Instituted in 1958, Hukou required every cit-
izen seeking a change in residence to obtain
permission from the public security bureau. If
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one wanted to move from a rural to urban area,
for example he (or she) had to convert his (or
her) local registration status from “agricultural”
to “nonagricultural,” an approval that was usu-
ally very difficult.1 It has also been very dif-
ficult to move from a small city to a large city
under Hukou. Urban registration brings substan-
tial benefits such as access to coveted jobs in
the state sector, housing, public schooling, and
health care.2 Hukou imposes both direct and
indirect costs of relocation. For example, per-
manently leaving a village requires a migrant
to abandon claims to land ownership and profits
of village-owned industries. Hukou is effectively
an internal passport system, as moving within or
across provincial boundaries in China is analo-
gous to moving across international boundaries.
1. Barriers to relocation are usually lower for persons
admitted to university or recruited by the military.
2. Until the early 1990s, urban Hukou also entitled a
person to “grain rations”—rations of necessities such as
grain products and kerosene.
ABBREVIATIONS
CPI: Consumer Price Index
FAI: Foreign Asset Investment
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
OLS: Ordinary Least Square
SSE: Sum of Squared Error
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Thus, for researchers interested in the study of
how restrictions affect the scale and structure of
worldwide migration, China is a tremendously
valuable natural experiment.
Hukou has undergone an incremental disman-
tling over the last three decades. The history
of this dismantling may be broken down into
three periods—the 1980s, 1990s, and post-2000
period.3 Up to the late 1980s, anyone wishing
to travel within China had to show an official
“permission” letter from his or her local govern-
ment. Beginning in the late 1980s, identity cards
replaced permission letters, making it much eas-
ier to travel. During the early 1990s, grain
rationing coupons were abolished. These cou-
pons had been the means by which people
obtained food rations and they could only be
used in the place of residence. In 2001, resi-
dency in small towns and townships was opened
to all rural workers who were legally employed
and had a place to live. At roughly the same
time, medium-sized cities and some provincial
capitals eliminated ceilings on the number of
rural workers who could apply for permanent
residence status or offer temporary registration
for nonlocal residents. Some very large cities
such as Shanghai and Beijing also eased restric-
tions on in-migration of nonlocal residents.4
Since census data on migration flows are avail-
able back to 1985–90, a test of deregulation’s
effects is feasible.
A small and mostly empirical literature on
the determinants of internal migration in China
has emerged. Its focus has been to examine the
extent to which migration flows are driven by
regional differences in labor markets.5 While
most researchers recognize the influence of
Hukou on Chinese migration patterns, no study
3. For more detailed history and analysis of Hukou, see
Chan (1994), Chan and Zhang (1999), Cheng and Selden
(1994), Day and Xia (1994), Goldstein (1990), Goldstein and
Goldstein (1990), Wang (1997), Davin (1999), and Liang
(2001).
4. There were other reforms at work too. First, rural
workers were allowed to choose their sectors of employ-
ment. Second, in large coastal cities tax concessions,
attractive terms for leasing land, economic development
areas, and high technology development zones, were
introduced.
5. The literature can be divided into studies utilizing
micro-data obtained from special household surveys (e.g.,
Liang 2001; Liang and White 1996, 1997; Zhao 1997,
1999a, 1999b, 2002, 2003) and those utilizing province-level
aggregate data (e.g., Fan 2005; Lin et al. 2004; Poncet 2006;
and Bao et al. 2006). An entire issue of Urban Studies was
devoted to China’s growing migration and urbanization (see
especially Chen and Coulson 2002; Liang, Chen, and Gu
2002; Li and Zahniser 2002; and Goodkind and West 2002).
has attempted to estimate its effects on the scale
and structure of migration.6 While there have
been applications of the modified gravity model
to the Chinese case, no study has estimated
this model with a Hukou measure included.7
The most closely related study is Poncet (2006).
She argued that as deregulation intensified,
migration should have become more responsive
to economic factors. Estimating a modified grav-
ity model on migration data for 1985–90 and
1990–95, Poncet found that intra- and inter-
provincial migration rates were more responsive
to spatial income and unemployment rate dif-
ferences during 1990–95. However, she did not
include a Hukou variable in either her theoret-
ical model or empirical specifications. Further-
more, Poncet’s coefficient estimates likely suffer
from omitted variables bias because a number of
important controls were absent. Missing controls
include migrant networks, foreign and domestic
investments, industry mix, demographic charac-
teristics, climate, and educational attainment.
The goal of this study is twofold. First,
we seek to estimate migration’s sensitivity to
Hukou. We incorporate several measures of
Hukou into a modified gravity model of migra-
tion carefully nuanced to fit the Chinese case.
Using data from the Chinese censuses and other
sources, we test this model for the 1985–90,
1995–2000, and 2000–05 periods. Panel esti-
mation is carried out as a means of evaluat-
ing how the sensitivity of migration to Hukou
has changed over time. Second, we test our
hypotheses using a more carefully nuanced
and comprehensive model of migration than
will be found in earlier studies. China has
been experiencing a major transition from cen-
tral planning to a market-based system. This
transition has included large infusions of FDI
and domestic fixed asset investments, consider-
able social and cultural changes, and tremen-
dous growth in export markets, communica-
tions, and transportation infrastructure. China
has also experienced very large growth in
6. Several recent studies examine other effects of
Hukou. Au and Henderson (2006) developed a theoretical
model and test to show that Hukou has led to undersized
cities and losses in GDP. Whalley and Zhang (2004) used a
simulation model to show that in the absence of restrictions,
income inequality would have been much smaller. Wu and
Treiman (2004) found that education and membership in the
Communist Party are the most important factors affecting the
odds of converting from rural to urban Hukou.
7. The migration literature generally lacks studies of
migration’s sensitivity to restrictions. A recent exception
is Clark, Hatton, and Williamson’s (2007) study of U.S.
immigration.
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migrant networks, particularly in urban areas.
Earlier studies have not adequately included
controls for all these factors. Consequently, we
believe our test provides the most complete and
accurate picture of the scale and structure of
migration in China.
The remainder of this article is organized as
follows. Below we present a theoretical model
of interprovincial migration flows and empirical
specifications that include Hukou measures. We
then describe our data set, followed by a presen-
tation of the empirical results. The article con-
cludes with a discussion of the implications of
our findings for Western research on migration.
II. A THEORETICAL MODEL OF MIGRATION
Our theoretical model includes elements from
the models of Poncet (2006), Crozet (2004), and
Tabuchi and Thisse (2002). For simplicity, we
assume just one potential destination. Worker k
from province j must decide whether to relocate
to province i or stay home. Her objective is
to choose the location for which the perceived
quality of life, adjusting for all relocation costs,
is higher. Perceived quality of life in a province
is assumed to depend upon relative earnings
opportunities, the probability of finding a job,
and the availability of various amenities and
nontradable goods. Amenities and nontradable
goods could include, for example climate, the
availability of ethnic goods and services, quality
of schools, and public services. Furthermore,
perceived quality of life will depend upon the
size and proximity of a migrant network.
The migration decision will also depend upon
migration costs, which are assumed to vary
directly with distance. In the more general
case where there are R destination provinces
(including j), the migrant’s objective function is
kji = Wkji + ηki(1)
= ln[πiYi(dij )−ψ] + ηki i ∈ [1, R]
where πi is the probability of securing employ-
ment in province i, Yi is real income in i,
dij is the geographic distance between home
and host provinces, and ηki is a stochastic term
capturing all the other factors influencing the
migrant’s perceptions of the quality of life avail-
able in province i. Migration costs will rise
proportionately with distance because as dis-
tance rises, the out-of-pocket costs of moving,
the costs of acquiring information about labor
market opportunities in the province, and the
psychic costs of migration, will all be higher. In
our simplified (one-destination) case, the deci-
sion boils down to comparing the two equations
below and choosing the option associated with
the higher-value equation:
ki = Wki + ηki = ln[πiYi(dij )−ψ] + ηki(2)
kj = Wkj + ηkj = ln[πj Yj ] + ηkj .(3)
As there are no migration costs associated with
the “stay home” option (Equation (3)), real
income, the probability of securing employ-
ment, and/or the migrant’s perceptions of pro-
vincial characteristics in i, must be higher to
overcome any explicit or implicit costs of mov-
ing there.
The migrant’s comparison of the values of
Equations (2) and (3) is equivalent to her cal-
culating the expected net benefits of migration,
ki − kj , and choosing to relocate only if those
net benefits are positive. Taking the difference
between Equations (2) and (3), the expected net
benefits to migration are
ki − kj = [ln(πi ) − ln(πj )](4)
+ [ln(Yi) − ln(Yj )] − ψ ln(dij )
+ [ηki − ηkj ].
Equation (4) implies that the likelihood of
migration will be higher: (1) the higher are
expected relative income in i, the relative prob-
ability of securing employment in i, and the
perceived relative favorability of other charac-
teristics of i; and (2) the lower is distance.
These are standard predictions implied by the
economic theory of internal migration due orig-
inally to Sjaastad (1962) and Greenwood (1969).
In the home province, where the prospective
migrant is assumed to have local Hukou, the
probability of securing employment depends
upon general labor market conditions, which are
reflected in the provincial unemployment rate.
Specifically, we posit that πj = g(uj ), where uj
is the unemployment rate in the home province.
In provinces where labor demand is relatively
weak, the unemployment rate will be higher and
it will be more difficult to find employment.
With subscripts as derivatives, this implies that
g1 < 0.
In the destination province, the unregistered
migrant can be hampered in finding a good job
by two factors—general labor market conditions
and the lack of household registration. There-
fore, the probability of securing employment
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depends upon both the unemployment rate and
the likelihood of obtaining Hukou:
πi = f [ui, pr{Hi}](5)
where ui is the unemployment rate in province i
and pr{Hi } is the probability of obtaining Hukou
there. It is assumed that f1 < 0 and f2 > 0. The
reason for f2 > 0 is that if a person lacks local
Hukou, she will be shut out of certain parts of
the labor market, that is, jobs in state enterprises
and more high-skill and better-paying jobs. Hav-
ing local Hukou not only provides one access to
coveted jobs, but access to a greater variety of
them. Even if the migrant doesn’t care about
securing Hukou, she may view the probability
of securing Hukou as an indicator of the “open-
ness” of the province. For example, provinces
where it is harder to obtain local registration
could be those that generally impose higher bar-
riers to entry. There could also be an interaction
effect between the unemployment rate and the
likelihood of securing local Hukou (f12 = 0).
For example, suppose an export boom affecting
all industries strengthens labor demand and low-
ers the unemployment rate. Although all workers
will experience a higher likelihood of securing
employment, those with local Hukou may expe-
rience an even bigger increase in the odds of
landing a job because they have access to a
greater variety of job opportunities (f12 < 0).
Incorporating πj = g(uj ) and Equation (5)
into Equation (4), the expected net benefits to
migration are now
ki −kj = [ln(πi (ui, pr{Hi}) − ln(πj (uj )](6)
+ [ln(Yi) − ln(Yj )] − ψ ln(dij )
+ [ηki − ηkj ].
Equation (6) implies that the probability of
migration is higher: (a) the higher is the unem-
ployment rate in the home province; (b) the
lower is the unemployment rate in the desti-
nation province; and (c) the higher is the per-
ceived probability of obtaining local Hukou
in the destination. In Section III, we work
with several empirical specifications implied by
Equation (6).
III. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS
The model above suggests a double-log
empirical specification where the dependent
variable is the log of the interprovincial migra-
tion rate [ln(Mij )], which is the number of per-
sons moving from province j to province i as a
percentage of all persons moving out of province
j .8 In using this specification for China, we
include explanatory variables from an assort-
ment of studies, including Lin et al. (2004), Bao
et al. (2006), and Poncet (2006). Our empirical
specification extends previous research in sev-
eral important ways. First, we add controls for
Hukou. Second, we add other measures which
are important for the study of the Chinese test
case. Third, ours is a panel study spanning three
periods.
We estimate three specifications. The first
is a panel version of a basic specification due
originally to Greenwood (1969, 1997) and
applied to the Chinese case by Lin et al. (2004):
ln(Mijt ) = α0 + α1ln(Yjit ) + α2Dij
(7)











θpProvincep + εij t ,
where Yjit = the ratio of destination province to
origin province income in period t ;
Dij = geographic distance between provinces;
πit (πj t ) = the probability of securing em-
ployment in the destination (origin) province in
period t ;
Zxt = other controls for perceived quality of
provincial life, in period t ;
Periodt = time period during which migra-
tion occurred, where there are T periods;
Provincep = origin province fixed effect,
where there are Z provinces;
εij t = random error term; and
the α, β, λ, and θ parameters are coefficients
to be estimated.
We hypothesize that α1 > 0, α2 < 0, α3 > 0,
and α4 < 0.
The next two empirical specifications are
extensions of Equation (7). Where they differ is
in how Hukou restrictions are measured. Before
describing each equation, it is important to note
that in China unemployment rates are estimated
using data only on locally registered persons.9
8. This specification, widely used in the literature, is due
originally to Greenwood (1969).
9. Undocumented migrants (also called members of the
“floating population”) are not included.
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Therefore, the official provincial unemployment
rate measures unemployment risk for a regis-
tered person only. Define uit (ujt ) as the reported
unemployment rate in the destination (origin)
province. It follows that (1–uit) is the prob-
ability of securing employment in the desti-
nation province when a person is registered
there and (1–ujt ) is the probability in the origin
province.
The first equation measures Hukou as simply
the odds of securing local registration:
(8)
ln(Mijt ) = α0 + α1ln(Yjit ) + α2Dij + α3
× ln(1 − uit ) + α4ln(Hukpercentit )














θpProvincep + εij t
where “Hukpercent” is the probability of secur-
ing local Hukou. Given available data, we mea-
sure Hukpercent as the lagged relative frequency
of registered households. It is assumed that
prospective migrants know the historical rel-
ative frequencies of registered households in
their prospective destinations and have adap-
tive expectations about barriers to entry. We
hypothesize that α4 > 0 , implying that when the
likelihood of securing Hukou rises, the migra-
tion rate will rise. The second equation measures
Hukou as the joint probability of an unregis-
tered migrant securing Hukou and securing a
job available only to someone with Hukou. This
measure equals one minus the unemployment
rate in the destination times the historical rela-
tive frequency of registered households:
(9)
ln(Mijt ) = α0 + α1ln(Yjit )
+ α2Dij + α3[ln(1 − uit )













θpProvincep + εij t .
While one minus the unemployment rate mea-
sures the likelihood of a registered migrant
securing a job, weighting that likelihood by the
likelihood of securing Hukou accounts for the
fact that unregistered migrants find it more dif-
ficult to secure employment in the destination
than those who are registered, all other things
equal. It is hypothesized that α3 in Equation (9)
is positive.
Another way of looking at the difference
between Equations (8) and (9) is that in (9),
Hukou is relevant to the migrant only if it
impacts the odds of securing employment in the
destination. In contrast, Equation (8) includes a
more expansive measure of Hukou, reflecting
the notion that the benefit of local Hukou goes
beyond getting a good job. Being registered
means having access to other kinds of benefits
in the destination.
The interactions between the time dummies
and the relative frequency of registered house-
holds [(Periodt) (Ln(Hukpercentit)] describe the
time-varying effects of Hukou on the incen-
tive to migrate. If the odds of obtaining Hukou
affect the incentive to migrate differently for
different periods, this will be reflected in pos-
itive or negative values of the χt coefficients in
Equations (8) and (9). The Hukou system has
been relaxed incrementally over the last three
decades, with some provinces reducing barriers
to local registration more than others. Greater
deregulation may have lowered the perceived
relevance of securing Hukou to the migration
decision and caused the migration rate to be less
sensitive to the odds of securing Hukou. In that
case, λt will be negative. On the other hand,
if greater ease of transportation and commu-
nication reduced migration costs, and macroe-
conomic reforms combined with growing pros-
perity substantially stimulated migration, then
having local registration may be more important
than before. In that case, λt will be positive.
Other controls (the x’s) included are described
below along with hypothesized signs on the
regression coefficients. Commentary is provided
for some controls:
1. Log size of the migrant community in the
destination that migrated before from the origin,
as a percent of the destination’s population (>0).
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2. Log ratio of real Foreign Direct Invest-
ment (FDI) or Foreign Asset Investment (FAI)
per capita in the destination to real FDI (FAI)
per capita in the origin (>0).
Higher investment in the destination will pull
in migrants from other provinces, but diminish
the incentive for residents of the destination to
leave.
3. Interaction of the log ratio of real FDI and
the log ratio of real FAI.
The two ratios are interacted to control for the
possibility that higher levels of one investment
type may influence the marginal effect of the
other on the migration rate. For example, foreign
firms investing in a province tend to compete for
the same pool of workers as do domestic firms.
Suppose there is higher FDI in the destination
which pulls migrants in to FDI-financed firms.
Now the pool of migrants available to FAI-
financed firms will be lower, hence the ability
of higher FAI to attract migration will be lower.
4. Log percentages of population enrolled in
the origin’s universities10 (<0) and the destina-
tion’s universities (>0).
A better-educated labor force often means
higher quality employment opportunities.
5. Log ratio of the share of manufacturing
employment in the destination to the share of
manufacturing employment in the origin (>0).
This ratio controls for industrial composition.
Manufacturing jobs are generally higher-paying
compared to agricultural jobs, thus provinces
with larger manufacturing sectors should have
higher in-migration rates, all other things equal.
6. Log ratio of the urban share of the desti-
nation province’s population to the urban share
of the origin province’s population (>0).
This ratio controls for the characteristics of
provinces with higher population densities.
For example, more urbanized provinces will
have different amenities, employment opportu-
nities, and standards of living, from more rural
provinces.
7. Log ratio of the destination province’s
minority population share11 to the origin prov-
ince’s minority population share (>0 or <0).
10. A better measure of educational attainment is the
percentage of the population that is college-educated; how-
ever, that is not available for individual provinces.
11. The proportion of a province’s population that
is a minority was computed in the following way:
minority share = ( total population−Han populationtotal population
) × 100.
First, provinces with larger minority populations
may be more politically divisive, which may
discourage in-migration. Second, as Bao et al.
(2006) suggest, provinces with more minorities
tend to lack basic service industries, which may
attract entrepreneurial migrants who establish
firms providing basic services. Third, high-
skill professionals may have a lower incentive
to migrate to provinces with higher minority
shares because high-skill employment opportu-
nities may be more limited there.
8. Log ratio of mean yearly temperature in
the capital city of the destination province to
mean yearly temperature in the capital city of
the origin province (>0).
9. Log share of real FAI in the origin
province devoted to transportation (<0).
When there are greater investments to expand
and upgrade railroads, airports, and highways,
the costs of relocating will fall.
10. Interaction of the log of real FAI and real
per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the
origin (>0).
Recall that an increase in FAI is hypothesized
to reduce out-migration. In poorer provinces,
where state-sponsored investment spending is
usually much lower to begin with, the marginal
productivity of new investment and the resulting
increase in labor demand may be much higher.
Consequently, the out-migration rate may fall
relatively more in poorer provinces than in
richer ones.
11. Interaction of the log of relative past
migration flows (item 1 above) and log of
distance (>0).
For a long distance move, the migrant will
place greater value on the destination’s migrant
community for assistance with relocation.
IV. DISCUSSION OF DATA
Our data are drawn from two major sources.
For the 1985–90 and 1995–2000 periods, we
expand the data set used by Lin et al. (2004) to
include data on new regressors.12 All data are
taken from the University of Michigan’s China
12. Note that we replaced Lin et al.’s (2004) calcula-
tions of the dependent variable with our own calculations.
The reason is that there are some inaccuracies in the series
used by Lin et al., which they acknowledged in communi-
cations with us.
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TABLE 1
Summary Statistics for 1985–90 Period 765 Observations
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum
Migration rate × 100a 3.775 6.982 79.336 0.018
Mean annual percentage of
households with Hukou status
during 1980–84 × 100
98.40 1.412 99.73 94.94
Real mean annual FDI per
capita during 1980–84b
$US 1.544 $US 5.947 $US 31.75 $US 0.0038
Real mean annual fixed asset
investment (FAI) per capita
during 1980–84c
163.77 Yuan 132.84 Yuan 518.71 Yuan 40.888 Yuan
Percentage of provincial FAI
attributable to transportation
infrastructure × 100
3.67 1.85 8.82 1.07
Railway distance between
capital cities
1,630.76 KM 1.87 KM 6,313.21 KM 137 KM
Real annual per capita incomec 510.95 Yuan 183.11 Yuan 1084.5 Yuan 340.53 Yuan
Percentage of population
enrolled in universities × 100
0.2499 0.2649 1.3 0.08
Unemployment rate × 100 1.178 0.705 4.11 0.28
Manufacturing share of
employment × 100
23.44 12.10 59.3 9.47
Urban share of population × 100 31.03 16.17 73.44 14.87
Mean yearly temperature 14.113 C 5.176 C 24.517 C 4.608 C
Minority population share × 100 12.28 16.06 59.43 0.31
aIn the 1990 Census, a migrant is defined as someone who has moved from other jiedao, town, or township and has lived in
this place for more than 1 year but less than 5 years. The migrants counted in this table are for interprovincial migration only.
bComputed using average annual CPI for 1980–84.
cComputed using income and CPI for 1989 only.
Data Online website (http://www.chinadataon-
line.org/). Our data set includes 2,425 observa-
tions, of which 40 with a zero migration rate
were excluded, for 29 provinces. There are 790
observations for 1985–90, 765 for 1995–2000,
and 790 for 2000–05.13 Destination migrant
stock data are unavailable for 1985–90 because
that is the first period for which information on
migration is available. However, for the subse-
quent periods we were able to create observa-
tions for the relative size of the destination’s
migrant network. We thus produced two sets
13. We skipped the 1990–95 period of migration for
an important reason. One of our objectives is to test for
structural changes in the migration equation between time
periods in postreform China. One question posed by this
study is: As the reforms deepened, especially as the easing of
barriers to mobility intensified, did the structure of migration
change? We contend that imposing a 5-year break in the
data makes it easier to ascertain whether or not structural
change occurred. Furthermore, the structure of China’s post-
reform labor market has been changing at an exponential
pace, with at least as much (if not more) structural change
occurring between 1995–2000 and 2000–05 as between
1985–90 and 1995–2000. Therefore, imposing the 5-year
break when comparing the 1980s and 1990s, as opposed to
no break between the 1990s and 2000s, should not bias the
coefficient estimates.
of estimates: (1) estimates for the full panel
with no migrant stock and (2) estimates for a
smaller panel comprising the later two periods
with migrant stock (1,580 observations).
Tables 1–3 show summary statistics. Starting
from the top, we describe the variable, its data
source, and trends:
1. Gross interprovincial migration rate:
For 1985–90, 1995–2000, and 2000–05,
respectively, migration rates are calculated
from samples comprising 1% of the 1990
population census, 0.95% of the 2000 cen-
sus,14 and 1% of the 2005 census. In the
14. As pointed out by Lin et al. (2004, p. 593), there
is a small difference between the 1990 and 2000 censuses
with respect to how migration flow is defined. If a per-
son is observed to change residence and to change their
household registration (“Hukou migration”), this is classi-
fied as migration in both censuses. If, however, the person
is observed to change residence without changing registra-
tion (“non-Hukou migration”), this is classified as “Hukou
migration” only if the migrant has been away from the place
(jiedao, town or township) of registration for a minimum
period and less than 5 years. In the 1990 (2000, 2005) cen-
sus, the minimum period is 1 year (6 months). To account
for this change in classification between periods, migration
statistics were standardized by discounting the 2000 numbers
by approximately 5%.
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TABLE 2
Summary Statistics for 1995–2000 Period 790 Observations
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum
Migration rate × 100a 3.589 7.230 87.317 0.014
Mean annual percentage of
households with Hukou status
during 1990–94 × 100
90.38 5.443 96.01 74.97
Past migration flows during
1985–95
2,498,500 6,854,100 89,320,000 10,000
Real mean annual FDI per capita
during 1990–94b
$US 16.14 $US 24.25 $US 92.73 $US 0.58
Real mean annual fixed asset
investment (FAI) per capita
during 1990–94b
871.66 Yuan 717.63 Yuan 3393.2 Yuan 229.7 Yuan
Percentage of provincial FAI
attributable to transportation
infrastructure × 100
5.48 2.04 11.07 2.81
Real annual per capita incomec 1,069 Yuan 442.2 Yuan 2,451.5 Yuan 605.26 Yuan
Percentage of population enrolled in
universities × 100
0.3769 0.3329 1.7 0.13
Unemployment rate × 100 4.40 2.41 9.64 1.36
Manufacturing share of employment
× 100
22.83 9.82 49.25 9.17
Mean yearly temperature (◦C) 14.113 5.176 24.517 4.608
Urban share of population × 100 40.20 18.56 90.67 18.63
Minority population share × 100 12.28 16.06 59.43 0.31
aIn the 2000 Census, a migrant is defined as someone who has moved from other jiedao, town, or township and has
lived in this place for more than 6 months but less than 5 years. The migrants counted in this table are for interprovincial
migration only.
bComputed using average annual CPI for 1990–94.
cComputed using income and CPI for 1999 only.
1990 (2000, 2005) census, respondents were
asked to report on mobility during 1985–90
(1995–2000, 2000–05, respectively). Mean
emigration surged from over 355,000 per-
sons during 1985–90 to over 1,075,000 dur-
ing 1995–2000, and to over 2,200,000 during
2000–05.15 Note that mean provincial popula-
tion rose by 9.44% (5.86%) between 1990 and
2000 (between 2000 and 2005). For the first
two periods, Sichuan had the largest emigra-
tion level (approximately 1,457,000 persons dur-
ing 1985–90 and 4,375,000 during 1995–2000),
while Ningxia had the lowest (approximately
54,500 persons during 1985–90 and 94,750 dur-
ing 1995–2000). During 1985–90, the high-
est migration rate was 79.34% (Guangxi to
Guangdong) and the lowest was 0.02% (a tie
between Jiangxi to Qinghai and Jiangxi to
Ningxia). During 1995–2000, the highest migra-
tion rate was 87.32% (Guangxi to Guangdong)
15. There are likely to be discrepancies in the calcu-
lations of these numbers between decades, for the reasons
discussed earlier.
and the lowest was 0.14% (Jiangxi to Qinghai).
For 2000–05, the highest in-migration rate
was 36.53% (Guangdong) and the lowest was
0.19% (Qinghai). The highest out-migration
rate was 20.54% (Gansu) and the lowest was
0% (Xinjiang).
2. The historical relative frequency of per-
sons with local Hukou: This is the ratio of reg-
istered population to total population at year’s
end. For the 1985–90 (1995–2000, 2000–05)
period, we used the mean annual proportion of
persons with Hukou during 1980–84 (1990–94,
1995–99, respectively). There are two reasons
we used the lagged proportion registrations.
First, this measure is consistent with its theoret-
ical counterpart (the lagged relative frequency
of persons with Hukou). Second, there is likely
two-way causality between in-migration and
current registrations in the destination. By using
the lagged proportion of registrations we avoid
simultaneous equations bias.
Tables 1–3 indicate interesting patterns
over time with respect to the proportion of
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TABLE 3
Summary Statistics for 2000–05 Period 790 Observations
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum
Migration rate × 100a 3.655 7.387 87.32 0.01
Mean annual percentage of
households with Hukou status
during 1995–99 × 100
88.57 6.726 95.85 67
Real mean annual FDI per
capita during 1995–99b
$US 44.64 $US 66.57 $US 253.05 $US 1.15
Real mean annual fixed asset
investment (FAI) per capita
during 1995–99b
2,452.8 Y 2,441.5 Y 12,705 Y 646.5 Y
Percentage of provincial FAI
attributable to transportation
infrastructure × 100
9.2 3.06 17.19 3.98
Real annual per capita incomec 5,122.3 Y 2,632.7 Y 13,484 Y 2,614.6 Y
Percentage of population
enrolled in universities × 100
0.9985 0.5985 3.06 0.4
Unemployment rate × 100 3.14 1.50 7.17 1.21
Manufacturing share of
employment × 100
22.83 9.82 49.25 9.17
Mean yearly temperature (◦C) 14.27 5.24 25.1 4.70
Urban share of population × 100 40.20 18.56 90.67 18.63
Minority population share × 100 12.83 16.47 60.13 0.31
aIn the 2005 Census, a migrant is defined as someone who has moved from other jiedao, town, or township and has lived
in this place for more than 6 months but less than 5 years. The migrants counted in this table are for interprovincial migration
only.
bComputed using average annual CPI for 1995–99.
cComputed using average annual income and CPI for 2000–05.
registered persons. First, note that despite Hukou
undergoing gradual relaxation, the proportion of
registered persons fell from an average of 98%
during the early 1980s to an average of 88.5%
during 2000–05. This is probably because non-
Hukou migrant flows grew faster than the
number of registered households. Second, the
variance of registrations across provinces rose
appreciably across decades. The spread between
the minimum and maximum percentages dur-
ing 1980–84 was 4.79%, but soared to 21.04%
during 1990–94 and 28.85% during 1995–99.
This means that provincial differences in barri-
ers to Hukou, hence the incentives to migrate,
rose substantially.
3. Migrant stock: Migrant stock is usually
measured as relative size of the accumulated
migrant community. Unfortunately, this mea-
sure is unavailable for China, so we used past
flows. For 1995–2000 (2000–05), migrant stock
equals migrant flows from provinces i to j during
1985–95 out of j’s population in 2000 (2005). It
is presumed that the stock of previous migrants
is proportional to previous flows.
4. Real annual per capita FDI and FAI: We
used mean annual real FDI (FAI) per capita
during 1980–84 when regressing 1985–90
migration flows, 1990–94 mean annual real FDI
(FAI) per capita when regressing 1995–2000
flows, and 1995–99 mean real FDI (FAI) per
capita when regressing 2000–05 flows. Invest-
ment was lagged because it takes time for
migration to respond to changes in investment.
Furthermore, since two-way causality between
investment and migration is likely, regressing
migration on lagged investment allows one to
avoid simultaneous equations bias. Investment
data were adjusted for cost of living differences
using national government measures of provin-
cial Consumer Price Index (CPI) and a 1985
base year. For most provinces, FDI was avail-
able yearly, but for some provinces there were
gaps in the data. No investment data were avail-
able for 1980–84 for several provinces, so we
used the earliest year available as a proxy. FDI
data are in U.S. dollars, whereas fixed asset
data are in Yuan. Comparing Tables 1–3, FAI
and FDI rose dramatically. Areas experiencing
the most investment tended to be large cities,
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whereas rural areas had the smallest amounts of
investment.
5. The share of manufacturing employment:
Manufacturing is classified in China as a
“Secondary” industry and construction is a big
component. There are substantial provincial dif-
ferences in manufacturing share. For all three
periods, Shanghai had the highest share and
Hainan the lowest.
6. Minority population share: This is the
percentage of non-Han population. Data on Han
population shares for 1990 are not available, so
we used 2000 data to proxy minority population
shares for the first two migration periods. For
2000–05, we used data on Han population
shares from the 2005 census.
7. Mean real per capita income: Due to lack
of available data for consecutive years dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s, income data only
for 1989 (1999) were used to measure average
annual income for 1985–90 (1995–2000). For
2000–05, we use mean incomes for each year.
Income data are adjusted for cost of living dif-
ferences using provincial CPI.
8. Mean educational attainment: Educational
attainment was measured as mean annual per-
centage of population enrolled in postsecondary
institutions during 1985–90, 1995–2000, and
2000–05. For all three periods, most people
in each province were not enrolled in colleges
or universities, reflecting substantial barriers to
access. However, as reforms deepened, enroll-
ments rose from approximately 0.25% during
1985–90 to approximately 1% during 2000–05.
The variance of mean annual enrollment per-
centages rose at an increasing rate, which may
have contributed to rising income inequality in
China.
Data on the remaining variables are from Lin
et al. (2004). Data sources and measurement of
these variables were detailed in their article.
V. COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES
Tables 4 and 5 provide results from ordi-
nary least square (OLS) estimation of Equations
(7)–(9). Table 4 presents results for the full
panel, whereas Table 5 presents results for the
smaller panel comprising the last two periods.
The important difference between the two tables
is that in Table 4, the migrant stock measure and
the interaction between migrant stock and dis-
tance are not included.
Our results reveal three broad patterns. First,
the results confirm the hypothesis that a strength-
ening (loosening) of Hukou restrictions will
deter (stimulate) migration. What is particu-
larly surprising is the high degree of sensitivity
of migration rates to Hukou restrictions. Sec-
ond, Table 5 demonstrates that the estimated
size of the migrant community is one of the
strongest determinants of interprovincial migra-
tion rates. Note that in a comparison of Tables 4
and 5, the omission or addition of the migrant
community variable will cause some coeffi-
cient estimates and goodness of fit to change
dramatically. This comes as no surprise, for
researchers since Sjaastad (1962) and Green-
wood (1969), as well as sociologists, have
argued that migrant networks tend to exert
strong influences on the scale of migration.
Third, our results demonstrate that the “basic
specification” (Equation (7)) used in earlier
studies is clearly an incomplete story about
internal migration in China.
We organize the discussion of more spe-
cific results as follows. We first discuss coeffi-
cient estimates for Hukou restrictions. We then
discuss the influences of past migration flows
and the other controls for provincial charac-
teristics. Before discussing specific results, we
must emphasize that interpretation of the numer-
ical coefficients in Tables 4 and 5 requires some
care due to the double-log functional form for
the regression equations and because some of
the independent variables are ratios. Each coef-
ficient is a migration elasticity, the percentage
change in the percentage of persons moving
from province j to province i (out of all per-
sons moving from j). Furthermore, some coef-
ficients are estimates of the percentage change
in the migration rate when there is a 1% change
in a ratio. For example, the coefficient on the
destination/origin income ratio measures the
estimated percentage change in the migration
rate when relative destination income changes
by 1%. Note that all estimated equations in
both tables include origin province fixed effects
and time period controls and are corrected for
heteroskedasticity. Finally, data on some per-
centage variables were multiplied by 100 to
allow for greater ease in the interpretation of
coefficients.
A. The Influence of Hukou
Tables 4 and 5 confirm that Hukou restric-
tions can have a substantial impact on the
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TABLE 4
OLS Results for Full Sample (1985–90, 1995–2000, and 2000–05 Migration Periods)a
Regressor I II III IV V
Log (odds of obtaining Hukou in





A × early dummy −23.89∗∗
(4.29)
A × late dummy −9.097∗∗
(2.629)







B × early dummy −9.848∗∗
(3.181)











































































































































Log (transportation share of fixed









Log (origin per capita GDP) × Log







































Adjusted R-squared 0.5499 0.5558 0.5608 0.5551 0.557
SSE 2,476.5 2,435.6 2,406.5 2,440.9 2,429.6
Sample size 2,385 2,385 2,385 2,385 2,385
Notes: Dependent variable = log gross interprovincial migration rate. Standard errors in parentheses.
aProvincial fixed effects are included and standard errors are corrected.
∗∗Significant at 1%; ∗significant at 5%.
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TABLE 5
OLS Results for Later Two Periodsa
Regressor I II III IV V VI
Log (odds of obtaining Hukou





A × middle dummy 21.88∗∗
(2.18)
Log (odds of migrant securing job

























































































































































Log (ratio of destination to origin
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Log (origin per capita GDP) × Log



































Adjusted R-squared 0.737 0.7591 0.7716 0.7593 0.7633 0.606
SSE 910 813.84 785.11 828.62 814.26 1,375
Sample size 1,580 1,580 1,580 1,580 1,580 1,580
Notes: Dependent variable = log gross interprovincial migration rate. Standard errors in parentheses.
aProvincial fixed effects are included and standard errors are corrected.
∗∗Significant at 1%; ∗significant at 5%.
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scale of interprovincial migration. Consider
first columns II and III in both tables, where
Hukou is measured by the lagged relative fre-
quency of registered households. While column
II in Table 4 indicates an insignificant effect of
Hukou, when the Hukou × time period inter-
actions are added, Hukou’s effect is strong and
significant. Specifically, column III predicts that
a 1% point increase in the perceived probability
of securing Hukou (e.g., suppose the odds rise
by one unit from 88.5 to 89.5 percentage points)
will induce an increase in the migration rate of
11.8%. Table 5 shows similar findings. From
column II, for example, a one-point increase
in the odds of securing Hukou will induce an
increase in the migration rate of about 8%. Con-
sider now columns IV and V in Tables 4 and 5,
where Hukou is measured as the joint probabil-
ity of an unregistered migrant securing Hukou
and a job available only to someone with Hukou.
From Table 4, when the odds of securing Hukou
rise by a percentage point the migration rate
rises between 3.53% and 4.73%. From Table 5,
a 1% point increase in the joint odds will induce
an increase in the migration rate of between
6.5% and 8%.
Tables 4 and 5 also reveal that the sensitiv-
ity of migration rates to changes in migration
restrictions can vary substantially across peri-
ods. In Table 4, the default period is 1995–2000,
so the coefficients on the interactions between
the time dummies and Hukou (rows 3–4, col-
umn III) are estimates of the difference between
the elasticity of migration with respect to the
odds of securing Hukou in one period rela-
tive to the middle period. The migration elas-
ticity is 23.89% lower in 1985–90 than in
1995–2000, but only 9% lower in 2000–05
than in 1995–2000. The sensitivity of migra-
tion to Hukou rose between the 1980s and 1990s
and fell between the 1990s and 2000s, but the
fall between the later two periods was less in
absolute value. Thus, measured over the three
decades, migration on balance is more sensi-
tive to Hukou now than back in the 1980s.
This suggests that as the comprehensive eco-
nomic reforms deepened and Hukou underwent
incremental reform, migration became more sen-
sitive to Hukou. The same pattern emerges in
column V, rows 6–7. When the joint odds mea-
sure of Hukou is used, migration is less sensitive
to Hukou in the early and later periods com-
pared to the middle period, but the diminution
in sensitivity is much less in the latest period. In
TABLE 6
Variation in Estimated Marginal Effect
















Log (odds of a migrant








Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
aCoefficients are taken from estimates of Equations (III)
and (V) in Table 4, provincial fixed effects are included, and
standard errors are corrected.
∗∗Significant at 1%; ∗significant at 5%.
Table 5, the default period is 2000–05. Accord-
ing to column III, row 3, the elasticity of migra-
tion with respect to the odds of securing Hukou
was nearly 22% higher in 2000–05 than in
1995–2000. According to column V, row 5, the
elasticity with respect to the odds of an unreg-
istered migrant securing a job and Hukou was
approximately 5% higher in 2000–05.
Table 6 pulls together the coefficients from
Table 4 and shows results of t tests on differ-
ences in the time period × Hukou interactions
across periods. Note that the default period is
1995–2000. The number in the last column
to the right in row 3 is the estimated differ-
ence between: (a) the change in the migration
elasticity (with respect to the odds of secur-
ing Hukou) from 1985–90 to 1995–2000; and
(b) the change in that elasticity from 1995–2000
to 2000–05. While the elasticity was lower
in the first and third periods compared to the
second period, it is lower than the middle
period by 14.8% in 2000–05. Note that the esti-
mated difference between (i) the 1985–90 and
1995–2000 difference in the elasticity; and (ii)
the 2000–05 and 1995–2000 difference in the
elasticity is significant at 1%. The number in the
last column to the right in row 4 shows the same
type of information for the migration elasticity
with respect to the joint odds measure of Hukou.
While that elasticity was lower in the first and
third periods, it was lower by 8% less in the last
period, a result significant at 1%.
The results in Table 6 imply an inverse
U-shaped relationship between the elasticity of
migration with respect to Hukou and time.
Between the 1980s and 1990s, migration’s
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sensitivity to Hukou apparently rose, which we
believe is a result of the deepening of economic
reforms and deregulation of migration. Follow-
ing the arrival of the new millennium, sensitivity
fell, perhaps because the above-normal returns
to migration had by then dissipated for most
prospective migrants.16 However, the sensitivity
of migration to Hukou was still higher in
the 2000s compared to the 1980s, consistent
with our general hypothesis that China’s move
toward a market system heightened incentives
to migrate.
B. The Influence of Migrant Networks
Table 5 illustrates the strong and robust
effects of migrant networks on the scale of inter-
provincial migration. Across different specifica-
tions, the elasticity of migration with respect
to past migration flows varies between approx-
imately 0.5% and 0.75%. For example, accord-
ing to column V, a one-point increase in the
migrant stock measure is estimated to cause the
migration rate to rise by approximately 0.75%.
Note that we find no evidence of an interaction
between migrant stock and distance. Of equal
importance is what we learn from column VI,
which indicates the effects on coefficient esti-
mates and goodness of fit when the migrant
stock variable is omitted. We find that some
coefficients on remaining variables change dra-
matically and the adjusted R-squared falls from
approximately 75% to 60%. These results illus-
trate that failure to control for migrant networks
will very likely lead to omitted variables bias.
C. The Influence of Provincial Controls Not
Included in Previous Studies
The results in columns II–V in Tables 4 and
5 illustrate that coefficient estimates from earlier
studies may suffer from omitted variables bias
because some important controls are excluded.
Turning first to column III in Table 4, we find
that the migration rate is positively related to
relative FDI in the destination; A 1% increase
in the ratio of destination to origin FDI gen-
erates an approximately 0.06% increase in the
migration rate. While relative FAI appears to
have no effect, the migration rate is positively
related to the interaction of the two investments.
The positive interaction term implies that an
increase in relative FDI boosts the sensitivity of
16. We thank T. N. Srinivasan for pointing this out to us.
migration to relative FAI. Note also the positive
and significant interaction between per capita
GDP and FAI per capita. This implies that in
less prosperous provinces, domestically financed
investment has a smaller effect on migration
than in more prosperous provinces. Column V
in Table 4 echoes this.
In Table 5, some of our provincial controls
exert important effects. According to column
III, the migration rate is negatively related to
the relative destination share of manufactur-
ing employment, the relative destination share
of minority population, the relative amount of
fixed investment in the destination, the invest-
ment interaction, and the share of fixed asset
investment comprising transportation infrastruc-
ture in the origin. As with the full panel, the
migration rate and relative FDI in the destina-
tion are positively related, although the effect
is smaller than in the full panel. The coeffi-
cient for relative fixed asset investment in the
destination is contrary to what is hypothesized,
but note from column VI that when past migra-
tion flows are omitted, the coefficient on this
investment ratio becomes positive and signif-
icant. We found this to be true for different
permutations of the migration equation when
past migration flows were excluded. Further
investigation confirmed the reason for the nega-
tive coefficients on the FAI term in columns III
and V—unexplained multicollinearity between
past migration and FAI.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We view this study as making two important
contributions to the literature. First, very little
is known in the migration literature about the
effects of restrictions on the scale and struc-
ture of migration. Due to lack of theoretical
work, lack for data for many countries, and
large international differences in the type and
quality of data, there are no studies addressing
questions such as: (i) How elastic are migra-
tion rates with respect to a change in quanti-
tative restrictions; (ii) Does migration become
more or less sensitive to restrictions as they ease
over time; and (iii) Do restrictions influence the
effects of other determinants on migration? This
study attempts to answer these sorts of ques-
tions. We seized upon a very convenient natural
experiment, China, a country with an internal
passport system that has been undergoing incre-
mental deregulation. For a cross-section study
of the effects of immigration restrictions, China
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is a beautiful case of “borders within a border,”
allowing a researcher to test for the effects of
restrictions across spatial units without having
to use different data sets for different countries
or having to control for country-specific influ-
ences such as type of political system, labor
market structure, regulations, and educational
system. Furthermore, China offers the researcher
the opportunity to study the effects of restric-
tions in a transition economy, one that has been
experiencing dramatic changes in the structure
of its markets.
What we learn from our examination of the
Chinese test case is that migration can be sig-
nificantly responsive to a loosening of restric-
tions. We find that even a modest reduction
in restrictions can greatly strengthen the incen-
tive to migrate. We find strong evidence that
the sensitivity of migration to Hukou has on
balance risen over the last 30 years, with the
greatest increase occurring during the 1990s. We
also find that adding migration restrictions to an
empirical specification can influence consider-
ably the effects that other determinants of migra-
tion have on migration. Therefore, restrictions
change not only the scale of migration, but its
structure. This inspires two questions for future
research: (1) Are our results for postreform
China generalizable to an international study?;
and (2) What can we predict will happen to
migration as a result of future adjustments in
the Hukou system?
Our second contribution is to further clarify
what drives migration in postreform China. We
see our study as generating two specific bene-
fits in this regard. First, we show that Hukou’s
influence can be substantial, implying that if the
goal of deregulation is to encourage more labor
mobility, then further deregulation is warranted.
Second, the empirical literature on Chinese
migration is still very small, comprising studies
that estimate relatively parsimonious equations
of migration rates. Most of these studies lack
controls for migrant communities in the desti-
nation, indicators of a spatial unit’s economic
and demographic structures, FDI and domes-
tic investments, export market dependency, and
other influences. We add migrant networks, FDI
and domestic fixed asset investments, industry
and ethnic mix, climate, origin fixed effects,
and more, to the modified gravity model of
Chinese migration. We find these controls can
contribute significantly to accounting for migra-
tion patterns across spatial units and time; hence
failure to include them is very likely to result
in omitted variables bias. Finally, ours is the
first comprehensive panel study of migration in
China.
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